Hegel's social theory of agency : the 'inner-outer' problem

In Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Hegel on Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 3-50 (2010)
The following is a chapter of a book and I should say something at the outset about the content of the book. The topic is Hegel’s “social theory of agency,” and that topic, given how the problem of agency is usually understood, raises the immediate question of why anyone would think that “sociality” would have anything at all to do with the “problem of agency.” That problem is understood in a number of ways; most generally – what distinguishes naturally occurring events from actions (if anything)? (Sometimes the question is: what, if anything, distinguishes responsible human doings from what animals do?) The most prominent approach has it that actions are things done intentionally by individuals, purposely, for a purpose. This is sometimes said to mean: acting from or on or because of an intention, although as we shall see this nominalization can be quite misleading. Or, of the many possible descriptions of some occurrence, it is an action is there is a true description which is intentional. This is often taken to mean simply that if you ask a person why he is doing something he can express this intention to explain himself, most often in the form of a reason. He does not (except in extraordinary circumstances) describe why he is acting in the way he might describe what caused his..
Keywords Action, Intention, Responsibility
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1413/26430
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,349
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Narrative and the Stability of Intention.Edward Hinchman - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):111-140.
Two Kinds of Agency.Pamela Hieronymi - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Action. Oxford University Press. pp. 138–162.
Hegel on Action.Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
Agency, Ownership, and the Standard Theory.Markus E. Schlosser - 2010 - In A. Buckareff, J. Aguilar & K. Frankish (eds.), New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 13-31.
Added to PP index

Total downloads
257 ( #13,760 of 2,193,594 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #145,717 of 2,193,594 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature