You Can't Eat Causal Cake with an Abstract Fork: An Argument Against Computational Theories of Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):154-90 (2012)
Abstract
Two of the most important concepts in contemporary philosophy of mind are computation and consciousness. This paper explores whether there is a strong relationship between these concepts in the following sense: is a computational theory of consciousness possible? That is, is the right kind of computation sufficient for the instantiation of consciousness. In this paper, I argue that the abstract nature of computational processes precludes computations from instantiating the concrete properties constitutive of consciousness. If this is correct, then not only is there no viable computational theory of consciousness, the Human Mental State Multiple Realizability in Silicon Thesis is almost certainly false.
Keywords Consciousness  Computation  Electrodynamics  Fractal dynamics  Field properties  Artificial Consciousness  Machine Consciousness
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,587
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
How to Eliminate Computational Eliminativism.Davor Pećnjak - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):433-439.
A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.
Against Structuralist Theories of Computational Implementation.Michael Rescorla - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):681-707.
Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
Theories of Consciousness.David Papineau - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 353.
Added to PP index
2013-01-15

Total downloads
35 ( #168,991 of 2,235,700 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #100,613 of 2,235,700 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature