Indexical Thought

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-70 (2013)
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Abstract

Call a thought whose expression involves the utterance of an indexical an indexical thought. Thus, my thoughts that I’m annoyed, that now is not the right time, that this is not acceptable, are all indexical thoughts. Such thoughts present a prima facie problem for the thesis that thought contents are phenomenally individuated -- i.e., that each distinct thought type has a proprietarily cognitive phenomenology such that its having that phenomenology makes it the thought that it is -- given the assumption that phenomenology is intrinsically determined. My concern in this paper is to blunt standard intuitions concerning the external individuation of indexical thought contents, and to defend a conception of indexical thought content that is entirely phenomenal and internalist.

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David Pitt
California State University, Los Angeles

Citations of this work

Mental Representation.David Pitt - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts.David Pitt - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 87-101.
On what we experience when we hear people speak.Anders Nes - 2016 - Phenomenology and Mind 10:58-85.
What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):919-932.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.
The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
Nonindexical contextualism.John MacFarlane - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):231-250.
De re senses.John Mcdowell - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (136):283-294.

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