Mental Representation

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020)
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Abstract

The notion of a "mental representation" is, arguably, in the first instance a theoretical construct of cognitive science. As such, it is a basic concept of the Computational Theory of Mind, according to which cognitive states and processes are constituted by the occurrence, transformation and storage (in the mind/brain) of information-bearing structures (representations) of one kind or another

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David Pitt
California State University, Los Angeles

Citations of this work

Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Culture and Cognitive Science.Andreas De Block & Daniel Kelly - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Embodied cognition: A field guide.Michael L. Anderson - 2003 - Artificial Intelligence 149 (1):91-130.
Creativity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 262-296.

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Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.

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