Projectionism, Realism, and Hume's Moral Sense Theory

Hume Studies 15 (1):61-92 (1989)

Abstract
My concern is the character of hume's moral theory. I contrast two interpretations of hume, The projectionist and the realist, Which disagree about how seriously we should take hume's own description of his theory as one according to which moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense. I offer reasons for rejecting the projectionist reading, And I explore the parallels drawn by hume between the operation of the moral sense and that of the external senses. I conclude that if there is a point to describing hume as a moral realist, This derives from the role of the moral sense
Keywords Hume
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ISBN(s) 0319-7336
DOI 10.1353/hms.2011.0485
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