Hume Studies 39 (1):37-59 (2013)

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Tony Pitson
University of Stirling
Abstract
Ourself, independent of the perception of every other object, is in reality nothing. An issue which has become prominent in recent discussions of Hume on personal identity 1 concerns the nature of the account to be found there of the mind or self.2 Hume famously rejects the idea of the self as something perfectly identical and simple in favor of the view that each of us is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement”. On the face of it, Hume endorses here a metaphysical claim about what the self is, namely, that it is a bundle of perceptions rather than..
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DOI 10.1353/hms.2013.0004
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