Philosophia 25 (1-4):247-266 (1997)
The dispositional account of colour has recently come under fire from a number of different directions (reflecting the various alternative options mentioned at the beginning). I believe that in the above I have dealt with the principal objections raised against this account by those who reject it. I cannot pretend to have established that the account is true; but if I am right about the failure of the objections I have discussed, and the difficulites of alternative accounts of colour, then dispositionalism appears to remain the most promising account of colour available
|Keywords||Color Epistemology Perception Sense Vision Locke|
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