Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36 (2004)
A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there's something it's like consciously to think that p, which is distinct from what it's like consciously to think that q. This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it. The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think them. This argument is defended against several objections. The second argument uses what I call "minimal pair" experiences--sentences read without and with understanding--to induce in the reader an experience of the kind I claim exists. Further objections are considered and rebutted
|Keywords||Cognition Externalism Intentionality Metaphysics Phenomenology|
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Citations of this work BETA
Understanding as Representation Manipulability.Daniel A. Wilkenfeld - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):997-1016.
Tracking Representationalism.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2014 - In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum. pp. 209-235.
The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion.Michelle Montague - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
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