Abstract

The multiverse theodicy says that because God can without cost create an infinite number of universes, the standards of acceptability that a conceivable universe must meet to be worthy of divine creation are significantly laxer than is typically supposed in discussions of the problem of evil. While the prospect of a theistic multiverse arguably helps the theist to explain suffering, I argue that it also poses a serious skeptical worry. Given the alleged laxity of the standards that a universe must meet to be worthy of inclusion in a theistic multiverse, there is reason to think that God would be justified in creating a great many deceptive universes that, while good overall, are inhabited by creatures who are radically mistaken in their beliefs. And these deceptive universes would arguably be no less abundant than the nondeceptive universes. After developing this skeptical challenge, I assess some possible theistic responses. One of the more promising responses I consider argues that in order to secure the great good of true friendship between God and creatures, God has reason to exclude deceptive universes from the multiverse even when those universes have great intrinsic value.