Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195):225-231 (1999)

Martin and Pfeifer claim ‘that the most typical characterizations of intentionality’ proposed by philosophers are satisfied by physical dispositions. If that is correct, we must conclude either, as they do and as Mumford (this volume) does, that the philosophers are wrong and intentionality is something else or, as I do, that intentionality is what the philosophers say it is, in which case it is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional; the intentionality of a disposition consists in its being directed towards its future manifestations. Mumford objects that the notion of directedness is obscure and cannot in the light of Martin’s electro‐fink argument be elucidated by reference to what would happen if the conditions for its manifestation are satisfied. But Martin‘s argument rests on the mistaken assumption that causal conditionals, of which dispositional ascriptions are an instance, are of the form ‘If p then q’
Keywords Intentionality  Logic  Mental States  Metaphysics  Martin, C  Mumford, S  Pfeifer, K
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00139
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,241
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
Dispositions and Conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
A World of States of Affairs.John Heil & D. M. Armstrong - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):115.
Fact, Fiction and Forecast.Edward H. Madden - 1955 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (2):271-273.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Case for Extrinsic Dispositions.J. McKitrick - 2003 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (2):155 – 174.
The Case Against Powers.Walter Ott - forthcoming - In Stathis Psillos, Benjamin Hill & Henrik Lagerlund (eds.), Causal Powers in Science: Blending Historical and Conceptual Perspectives. Oxford University Press.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Intentionality and Physical Systems.Margaret A. Boden - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (2):200-214.
Dispositions.Stephen Mumford - 1994 - Cogito 8 (2):141-146.
Is a Thomistic Theory of Intentionality Consistent with Physicalism?James D. Madden - 2017 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):1-28.
The Mental and the Physical—a Reply to Dr Meynell.Ullin T. Place - 1973 - Heythrop Journal 14 (4):417–424.
Naturally Intentional.Anna Aloisia Moser - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:157-165.
Dennett's Reduction of Brentano's Intentionality.Brent Silby - 2008 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 7.
Dispositions.Stephen Mumford - 1998 - Clarendon Press.
Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - 2016 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Objects of Intentionality.Colin McGinn - 2004 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge. De Gruyter.


Added to PP index

Total views
47 ( #197,335 of 2,325,145 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #108,957 of 2,325,145 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes