Positive epistemic status and proper function

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DOI 10.2307/2214067
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The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.
Belief and Aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
Evaluating Distributed Cognition.Adam Green - 2014 - Synthese 191 (1):79-95.
Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.

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