Positive epistemic status and proper function

Philosophical Perspectives 2:1-50 (1988)
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10.2307/2214067

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Alvin Plantinga
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
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Highlights of recent epistemology.James Pryor - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):95--124.
Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.
Belief and aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.

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