Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 90-109 (2008)

Marya Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction.
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DOI 10.2979/HYP.2008.23.4.90
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Social Construction of What?Ian Hacking - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
The Constitution of Selves.Marya Schechtman (ed.) - 1996 - Cornell University Press.
Survival and Identity.David K. Lewis - 1976 - In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
The Constitution of Selves.Christopher Williams & Marya Schechtman - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):641.

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Towards a Constitutive Account of Implicit Narrativity.Fleur Jongepier - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):51-66.

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