Oxford University Press (1993)

Authors
Alvin Plantinga
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Belief and doubt  Cognition
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Call number BD161.P57 1993
ISBN(s) 0195078632   0195078640   9780195078640   9780195078633
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Chapters BETA
Naturalism Versus Proper Function?

The account of warrant I propose, utilizing the notion of proper function as it does, is an example of naturalistic epistemology: it invokes no kind of normativity not to be found in the natural sciences; in this chapter and the next, I argue that naturalism in epistemology can flourish on... see more

Is Naturalism Irrational?

In this chapter, I continue to argue that naturalistic epistemology flourishes best in the garden of supernaturalistic metaphysics. I do so by presenting two epistemological arguments against metaphysical naturalism; the first argument is for the falsehood of naturalism, the second, and mo... see more

Warrant: Objections and Refinements

In order to achieve a deeper understanding of warrant (and in reply to some objections), I turn in this chapter to a closer look at the idea of a design plan. I do so under the following six section headings: the max plan versus the design plan, unintended by‐products, functional multiplic... see more

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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.Guy Kahane - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):103-125.
Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.

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