Erkenntnis 81 (2):349-373 (2016)

Benjamin Plommer
Oxford University
Andy Egan recently drew attention to a class of decision situations that provide a certain kind of informational feedback, which he claims constitute a counterexample to causal decision theory. Arntzenius and Wallace have sought to vindicate a form of CDT by describing a dynamic process of deliberation that culminates in a “mixed” decision. I show that, for many of the cases in question, this proposal depends on an incorrect way of calculating expected utilities, and argue that it is therefore unsuccessful. I then tentatively defend an alternative proposal by Joyce, which produces a similar process of dynamic deliberation but for a different reason.
Keywords Decision theory  Expected utility  Ratifiability  Causal decision theory  Regret  Decision instability  Dynamics of deliberation
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-015-9743-0
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References found in this work BETA

Causal Decision Theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation.Brian Skyrms - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.Allan Gibbard & William L. Harper - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 125-162.

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Normative Decision Theory.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772.

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