Are Moral Judgements Adaptations? Three Reasons Why It Is so Difficult to Tell

South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):425-439 (2017)

Authors
Thomas Pölzler
University of Graz
Abstract
An increasing number of scholars argue that moral judgements are adaptations, i.e., that they have been shaped by natural selection. Is this hypothesis true? In this paper I shall not attempt to answer this important question. Rather, I pursue the more modest aim of pointing out three difficulties that anybody who sets out to determine the adaptedness of moral judgments should be aware of (though some so far have not been aware of). First, the hypothesis that moral judgements are adaptations has been advocated in various different specificities and scopes, and on various different levels. Second, the three kinds of evidence that have most often been appealed to by discussants of this hypothesis require additional arguments. And third, there is significant reasonable disagreement about what moral judgements essentially are.
Keywords moral judgements  adaptation  evolution  morality
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1080/02580136.2017.1333354
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

On the Origin of Species.Charles Darwin - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

View all 83 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral Judgments and Emotions: A Less Intimate Relationship Than Recently Claimed.Thomas Pölzler - 2015 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 35 (3):177-195.
Moral Cognitivism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25.
The Wisdom of the Pack.Neil Levy - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):99 – 103.
Eine Kritik an Norbert Hoersters Theorie der Normenvertretung.Vuko Andrić - 2010 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 64 (1):62-83.
Motivational Judgement Internalism and The Problem of Supererogation.Alfred Archer - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:601-621.
Evolution, Moral Justification, and Moral Realism.Uwe Peters - 2012 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 3 (1):8–18.
Moral Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):93–109.
The Error in the Error Theory.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):347-369.
Moral Intuitions, Moral Expertise and Moral Reasoning.Albert W. Musschenga - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):597-613.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-11-17

Total views
138 ( #52,618 of 2,248,764 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #34,428 of 2,248,764 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature