Dynamic permissivism

Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1923-1939 (2016)
There has been considerable philosophical debate in recent years over a thesis called epistemic permissivism. According to the permissivist, it is possible for two agents to have the exact same total body of evidence and yet differ in their belief attitudes towards some proposition, without either being irrational. However, I argue, not enough attention has been paid to the distinction between different ways in which permissivism might be true. In this paper, I present a taxonomy of forms of epistemic permissivism framed as the upshot of different ways one might respond to a basic argument against the view from Roger White. I then introduce a new type of permissive view which the contemporary debate has completely ignored and which is made available when we reject a widespread and largely unexamined background commitment to static rational norms connecting beliefs and evidence in favor of dynamic norms governing processes of consideration. I show how the dynamic strategy of rejecting static norms on belief opens the door to a new kind of permissivism which is both independently attractive and especially well-placed to answer worries that have been raised against traditional permissivist views.
Keywords Rationality  Epistemology  Permissivism
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0585-z
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References found in this work BETA
Judgement and Justification.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Time-Slice Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):449-491.
Wide or Narrow Scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.

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The Trouble with Having Standards.Han Li - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.

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