Infinitism and epistemic normativity

Synthese 178 (3):515-527 (2011)

Authors
Adam C. Podlaskowski
Fairmont State University
Joshua Smith
Central Michigan University
Joshua Smith
Central Michigan University
Abstract
Klein’s account of epistemic justification, infinitism, supplies a novel solution to the regress problem. We argue that concentrating on the normative aspect of justification exposes a number of unpalatable consequences for infinitism, all of which warrant rejecting the position. As an intermediary step, we develop a stronger version of the ‘finite minds’ objection.
Keywords Infinitism  Epistemic responsibility  Normativity  Regress problem  Klein
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9654-1
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References found in this work BETA

Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

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Citations of this work BETA

Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity.John Turri - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795.

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