The Reasoner 3 (1):4-5 (2009)

Karlis Podnieks
University of Latvia
If we consider modeling not as a heap of contingent structures, but (where possible) as evolving coordinated systems of models, then we can reasonably explain as "direct representations" even some very complicated model-based cognitive situations. Scientific modeling is not as indirect as it may seem. "Direct theorizing" comes later, as the result of a successful model evolution.
Keywords models  modeling  model of cognition
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References found in this work BETA

The New Paradox of the Stone.M. P. Smith - 1988 - Faith and Philosophy 5 (3):283-290.

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Modelling as Indirect Representation? The Lotka–Volterra Model Revisited.Tarja Knuuttila & Andrea Loettgers - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (4):1007-1036.

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