Theoria 76 (2):112-118 (2010)

Adam C. Podlaskowski
Fairmont State University
From the dictum "ought implies can", it has been argued that no account of belief's normativity can avoid the unpalatable result that, for unbelievable propositions such as "It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining", one ought not to believe them even if true. In this article, I argue that this move only succeeds on a faulty assumption about the conjunction of doxastic "oughts.".
Keywords conjunction of beliefs  normativity of belief
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01062.x
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn., Wesleyan University Press.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.

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