Theoria 76 (2):112-118 (2010)

Authors
Adam C. Podlaskowski
Fairmont State University
Abstract
From the dictum "ought implies can", it has been argued that no account of belief's normativity can avoid the unpalatable result that, for unbelievable propositions such as "It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining", one ought not to believe them even if true. In this article, I argue that this move only succeeds on a faulty assumption about the conjunction of doxastic "oughts.".
Keywords conjunction of beliefs  normativity of belief
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01062.x
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References found in this work BETA

How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
The Normativity of Content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.
Does Thought Imply Ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.
The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification.William Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.

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