Different Voices, Perfect Storms, and Asking Grandma What She Thinks: Situating Experimental Philosophy in Relation to Feminist Philosophy
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1):1-24 (2015)
AbstractAt first glance it might appear that experimental philosophers and feminist philosophers would make good allies. Nonetheless, experimental philosophy has received criticism from feminist fronts, both for its methodology and for some of its guiding assumptions. Adding to this critical literature, I raise questions concerning the ways in which “differences” in intuitions are employed in experimental philosophy. Specifically, I distinguish between two ways in which differences in intuitions might play a role in philosophical practice, one which puts an end to philosophical conversation and the other which provides impetus for beginning one. Insofar as experimental philosophers are engaged in deploying “differences” in intuitions in the former rather than the latter sense, I argue that their approach is antithetical to feminist projects. Moreover, this is even the case when experimental philosophers deploy “differences” in intuitions along lines of gender.
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Citations of this work
Jane Addams as Experimental Philosopher.Joshua August Skorburg - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):918-938.
In Defence of Different Voices.Helen Beebee & Anne-Marie McCallion - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
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