Artificial Intelligence 133 (1-2):233-282 (2001)

The question addressed in this paper is how the degree of justification of a belief is determined. A conclusion may be supported by several different arguments, the arguments typically being defeasible, and there may also be arguments of varying strengths for defeaters for some of the supporting arguments. What is sought is a way of computing the “on sum” degree of justification of a conclusion in terms of the degrees of justification of all relevant premises and the strengths of all relevant reasons.
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DOI 10.1016/s0004-3702(01)00145-x
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Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.

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