MIT Press (1989)

Pollock describes an exciting theory of rationality and its partial implementation in OSCAR, a computer system whose descendants will literally be persons.
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Cognition  Functionalism  Mental States  Metaphysics  Mind  Person  Rationality  Self-consciousness
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Reprint years 1992
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ISBN(s) 0262161133   0262512238   9780262161138
DOI 10.2307/2185953
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Mental Models and the Tractability of Everyday Reasoning.Mike Oaksford - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):360-361.

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