Philosophy Compass 4 (5):822-834 (2009)
Identity theories are those that hold that 'sensations are brain processes'. In particular, they hold that mental/psychological state kinds are identical to brain/neuroscientific state kinds. In this paper, I isolate and explain some of the key features of contemporary identity theories. They are then contrasted with the main live alternatives by means of considering the two most important lines of objection to identity theories.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Oxford University Press.
Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1998 - MIT Press.
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation.James Woodward - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Functionalism and Type-Type Identity Theories.Frank Jackson, Robert Pargetter & E. W. Prior - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (September):209-25.
Best-Candidate Theories and Identity: Reply to Brennan.B. J. Garrett - 1988 - Inquiry 31 (1):79 – 85.
Distinctiveness of the Unseen: Buddhist Identity.Sarunya PRASOPCHINGCHANA & Dana SUGU - 2009 - International Journal on Humanistic Ideology 2 (2):115-145.
A Deflationary Theory Of Diachronic Identity.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):19 - 37.
Added to index2009-07-26
Total downloads91 ( #53,928 of 2,146,278 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #185,331 of 2,146,278 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.