Discipline Filosofiche 24 (2):67-90 (2014)

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What would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of the use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology to be. In this article I suggest an answer to this question through a discussion of certain claims made in connection to the “post-cognitivist” approach to cognitive science by Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher and Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. I suggest that these claims are indicative of an appropriation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought that he would have welcomed as innovative science. Despite this, I argue that he would have viewed this use of his work as potentially occluding the full philosophical significance that he believed his phenomenological investigations to contain.
Keywords Phenomenology  Naturalization of Phenomenology  Lived Body  Motor-intentionality  Body Schema  Shaun Gallagher  Hubert Dreyfus  Franciso Varela  Evan Thompson
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References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.

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