Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Cognitive Science
Discipline Filosofiche : Merleau-Ponty and the Natural Sciences (2):67-90 (2014)
AbstractWhat would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of the use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology to be. In this article I suggest an answer to this question through a discussion of certain claims made in connection to the “post-cognitivist” approach to cognitive science by Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher and Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. I suggest that these claims are indicative of an appropriation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought that he would have welcomed as innovative science. Despite this, I argue that he would have viewed this use of his work as potentially occluding the full philosophical significance that he believed his phenomenological investigations to contain.
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Citations of this work
Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science.Shaun Gallagher - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):125-137.
Embodied higher cognition: insights from Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of motor intentionality.Jan Halák - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-29.
On Characterizing Metaphysical Naturalism.Lok-Chi Chan - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:232-260.
Minding Nature: Gallagher and the Relevance of Phenomenology to Cognitive Science.Michael Wheeler & María Jimena Clavel Vázquez - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):145-158.
Gallagher on Non-Reductive Naturalism: Complementarity, Integration or Multiscale Science?Patrick McGivern - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):159-170.
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