Physicalism and Moorean Supervenience

Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):72-92 (2013)
G. E. Moore argues that goodness is an intrinsic non-natural property that supervenes irreducibly on the intrinsic natural properties of its bearers. Accordingly, it is often supposed that “Moorean” supervenience is incompatible with physicalism, a naturalistic thesis. In this paper I argue that Moorean supervenience is not in itself incompatible with physicalism, Moore’s ethical non-naturalism notwithstanding. Understanding why will help us to better appreciate the full range of resources available to physicalists.
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DOI 10.1111/phib.12007
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Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.Lewis David - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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