Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):72-92 (2013)

Abstract
G. E. Moore argues that goodness is an intrinsic non-natural property that supervenes irreducibly on the intrinsic natural properties of its bearers. Accordingly, it is often supposed that “Moorean” supervenience is incompatible with physicalism, a naturalistic thesis. In this paper I argue that Moorean supervenience is not in itself incompatible with physicalism, Moore’s ethical non-naturalism notwithstanding. Understanding why will help us to better appreciate the full range of resources available to physicalists.
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DOI 10.1111/phib.12007
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mental Causation as Joint Causation.Chiwook Won - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4917-4937.
Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):537-551.

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