Reliability and Justified Belief

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1):103 - 114 (1984)
Reliabilist theories propose to analyse epistemic justification in terms of reliability. This paper argues that if we pay attention to the details of probability theory we find that there is no concept of reliability that can possibly play the role required by reliabilist theories. A distinction is drawn between the general reliability of a process and the single case reliability of an individual belief, And it is argued that neither notion can serve the reliabilist adequately
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.1984.10716371
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William J. Talbott (2016). A New Reliability Defeater for Evolutionary Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):538-564.

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