The two-dimensional argument against materialism and its semantic premise

Diametros 29 (29):80-92 (2011)
David Chalmers argues that zombies are possible because they are ideally conceivable and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on the physical. In this paper I discuss the most influential criticism of the conceivability-possibility principle in the current literature. According to that criticism, the conceivability-possibility principle is unjustified because it depends on a certain unjustified assumption concerning the semantic conditions under which necessary statements can be true a posteriori, namely that a posteriority is due to contingency at the reference-fixing level, so that a necessary statement can be true a posteriori only if at least one of the concepts flanking the identity sign refers contingently.
Keywords Chalmers  zombies  materialism
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The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism.David J. Chalmers - 2009 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
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