Frontiers in Psychology 11 (2020)
AbstractThis paper considers some foundational concepts in ecological psychology and in enactivism., and traces their developments from their historical roots to current preoccupations. Important differences stem, we claim, from dissimilarities in how embodied experience has been understood by the ancestors, founders and followers of ecological psychology and enactivism, respectively. Rather than pointing to differences in domains of interest for the respective approaches, and restating possible divisions of labor between them in research in the cognitive and psychological sciences, we call for a deeper analysis of the role of embodiment in agency that we also undertake. Awareness of the differences that exist in the respective frameworks and their consequences, we argue, may lead to overcoming some current divisions of labor and responsibility, and contribute to a more comprehensive and complementary way of dealing with a broader range of theoretical and practical concerns. While providing some examples of domains, such as social cognition and art reception, in which we can observe the relative usefulness and potential integration of the theoretical and methodological resources from the two approaches, we demonstrate that such deeper synergy is not only possible but also beginning to emerge. Such complementarity, as we envisage, conceives of ecological psychology that allows felt experience as a crucial dynamical element in the explanations and models that it produces, and of an enactive approach that takes into consideration the ubiquitous presence of rich directly perceived relations among variables arising from enactments in the social and physical world.
Similar books and articles
Enactivism Embraces Ecological Psychology.Mog Stapleton - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):325-327.
Agency From a Radical Embodied Standpoint: An Ecological-Enactive Proposal.Miguel Segundo-Ortin - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11 (1319).
Enactivism and Ecological Psychology: Divided by Common Ground.M. McGann - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):312-315.
Extended Mind, Extended Conscious Mind, Enactivism.Victor Loughlin - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Antwerp
Radical Enactivism and Ecological Psychology: Friends or Foes?K. Zahidi & J. V. Eemeren - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):320-322.
Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency.Oliver Lukitsch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):955-975.
Defining the Environment in Organism–Environment Systems.Amanda Corris - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:1285.
Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism.Dave Ward - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):650-680.
Pragmatism, enactivism, and ecological psychology: towards a unified approach to post-cognitivism.Manuel Heras-Escribano - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):337-363.
Just doing what I do: on the awareness of fluent agency.James M. Dow - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):155-177.
The only wrong cell is the dead one: On the enactive approach to normativity.Manuel Heras-Escribano, Jason Noble & Manuel De Pinedo García - 2013 - In Advances in Artificial Life (ECAL 2013). Cambridge, Massachusetts, EE. UU.: pp. 665-670.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Artificial Intelligence Inheriting the Historical Crisis in Psychology: An Epistemological and Methodological Investigation of Challenges and Alternatives.Mohamad El Maouch & Zheng Jin - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
References found in this work
The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition.James J. Gibson - 1979 - Houghton Mifflin.
The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience.Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson & Eleanor Rosch - 1991 - MIT Press.
Phenomenology of Perception.Maurice Merleau-Ponty - 1962 - Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: The Humanities Press.