Some remarks on panpsychism and epiphenomenalism

Dialectica 31 (1‐2):177-86 (1977)
Many writers, both scientists and philosophers, when discussing the mind‐body problem, adopt what might be called the physicalist principle of the closedness of the physical world. They reject the possibility that the physical world is causally open to a realm of conscious experience that is not part of it.Among the upholders of such a view are those who may be called radical materialists or radical physicalists, who deny that there exists a realm of conscious experience. Also, there are the proponents of various identity theories, who admit that there is such a realm, but claim that it may be in some sense identified with parts of the physical world.There are, however, other writers who accept the physicalist principle, but who nevertheless also accept that there exists a genuinely autonomous realm of conscious experience. Such writers often hold some form of panpsychism or epiphenomenalism, and in what follows these two views are briefly explained and critically discussed
Keywords Biology  Dualism  Epiphenomenalism  Panpsychism  Physicalism  Science  Clifford, W  Darwin
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1977.tb01363.x
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Bernhard Rensch (1971). Biophilosophy. New York: Columbia University Press.

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