Consequentializing

Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347 (2009)
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Abstract

A growing trend of thought has it that any plausible nonconsequentialist theory can be consequentialized, which is to say that it can be given a consequentialist representation. In this essay, I explore both whether this claim is true and what its implications are. I also explain the procedure for consequentializing a nonconsequentialist theory and give an account of the motivation for doing so.

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original Portmore, Douglas W. (forthcoming) "Consequentializing".

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Douglas W. Portmore
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

Cluelessness.Hilary Greaves - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):311-339.
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References found in this work

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon (ed.) - 1998 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
A theory of justice.John Rawls - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn, Exploring ethics: an introductory anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 133-135.

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