Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism

In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press (2011)
Abstract
IN THIS PAPER, I make a presumptive case for moral rationalism: the view that agents can be morally required to do only what they have decisive reason to do, all things considered. And I argue that this view leads us to reject all traditional versions of act‐consequentialism. I begin by explaining how moral rationalism leads us to reject utilitarianism
Keywords consequentialism  emandingness objection  utilitarianism  moral rationalism
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Probabilistic Promotion Revisited.Jeff Behrends & Joshua DiPaolo - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1735-1754.

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