O Que Nos Faz Pensar 17:107-123 (2003)

André Porto
Universidade Federal de Goiás
O artigo discute as recentes propostas de uma noção construtivista de verdade que não se confunda com condições de assertabilidade.
Keywords Wittgenstein  Intuitionism  Philosophy of Mathematics
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