Dual-ranking act-consequentialism

Philosophical Studies 138 (3):409 - 427 (2008)
Authors
Douglas W. Portmore
Arizona State University
Abstract
Dual-ranking act-consequentialism (DRAC) is a rather peculiar version of act-consequentialism. Unlike more traditional forms of act-consequentialism, DRAC doesn’t take the deontic status of an action to be a function of some evaluative ranking of outcomes. Rather, it takes the deontic status of an action to be a function of some non-evaluative ranking that is in turn a function of two auxiliary rankings that are evaluative. I argue that DRAC is promising in that it can accommodate certain features of commonsense morality that no single-ranking version of act-consequentialism can: supererogation, agent-centered options, and the self-other asymmetry. I also defend DRAC against three objections: (1) that its dual-ranking structure is ad hoc, (2) that it denies (putatively implausibly) that it is always permissible to make self-sacrifices that don’t make things worse for others, and (3) that it violates certain axioms of expected utility theory, viz., transitivity and independence.
Keywords Utilitarianism  Consequentialism  Self-other asymmetry  Options  Sider  Splawn
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-006-9059-7
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 34,515
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Limits of Morality.Shelly Kagan - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Consequentializing.Douglas W. Portmore - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329-347.
Ross and the Particularism/Generalism Divide.Kristian Olsen - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):56-75.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
75 ( #83,470 of 2,268,266 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #83,202 of 2,268,266 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature