McNaughton and Rawling on the Agent-Relative/Agent-Neutral Distinction

Utilitas 13 (3):350-356 (2001)

Abstract

In this paper, I criticize David McNaughton and Piers Rawling's formalization of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I argue that their formalization is unable to accommodate an important ethical distinction between two types of conditional obligations. I then suggest a way of revising their formalization so as to fix the problem

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Douglas W. Portmore
Arizona State University

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

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