Utilitas 13 (3):350-356 (2001)

Authors
Douglas W. Portmore
Arizona State University
Abstract
In this paper, I criticize David McNaughton and Piers Rawling's formalization of the agent-relative/agent-neutral distinction. I argue that their formalization is unable to accommodate an important ethical distinction between two types of conditional obligations. I then suggest a way of revising their formalization so as to fix the problem
Keywords agent-relative  agent-neutral  conditional obligations
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DOI 10.1017/s095382080000323x
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Morality, Mortality.F. M. Kamm - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.

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Distinguishing Agent-Relativity From Agent-Neutrality.Matthew Hammerton - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):239-250.

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