In Simon Kirchin (ed.), Reading Parfit. Routledge (forthcoming)
I argue that rule consequentialism sometimes requires us to act in ways that we lack sufficient reason to act. And this presents a dilemma for Parfit. Either Parfit should concede that we should reject rule consequentialism (and, hence, Triple Theory, which implies it) despite the putatively strong reasons that he believes we have for accepting the view or he should deny that morality has the importance he attributes to it. For if morality is such that we sometimes have decisive reason to act wrongly, then what we should be concerned with, practically speaking, is not with the morality of our actions, but with whether our actions are supported by sufficient reasons. We could, then, for all intents and purposes just ignore morality and focus on what we have sufficient reason to do, all things considered. So if my arguments are cogent, they show that Parfit’s Triple Theory is either false or relatively unimportant in that we can, for all intents and purposes, simply ignore its requirements and just do whatever it is that we have sufficient reason to do, all things considered.
|Keywords||Derek Parfit Rule Consequentialism Practical Reasons|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
A Counterexample to Parfit's Rule Consequentialism.Jacob Nebel - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy:00-00.
Review: Parfit on Self-Interest, Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism: A Selective Critique of Parfit's "Reasons and Persons". [REVIEW]Lanning Sowden - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (145):514 - 535.
Consequentialism and Moral Rationalism.Douglas W. Portmore - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.
A Dilemma for Parfit's Conception of Normativity.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):466-474.
Review of Derek Parfit, On What Matters. [REVIEW]Jonny Anomaly - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):358-360.
Chapter 5: Dual-Ranking Act-Consequentialism: Reasons, Morality, and Overridingness.Douglas W. Portmore - manuscript
Desires, Values, Reasons, and the Dualism of Practical Reason.Michael Smith - 2009 - Ratio 22 (1):98-125.
Added to index2012-12-05
Total downloads364 ( #7,091 of 2,153,860 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #17,135 of 2,153,860 )
How can I increase my downloads?