Perform Your Best Option

Journal of Philosophy 110 (8):436-459 (2013)
We ought to perform our best option—that is, the option that we have most reason, all things considered, to perform. This is perhaps the most fundamental and least controversial of all normative principles concerning action. Yet, it is not, I believe, well understood. For even setting aside questions about what our options are and what our reasons are, there are prior questions concerning how best to formulate the principle. In this paper, I address these questions. One of the more interesting upshots of this inquiry is that the deontic statuses (e.g., obligatory, optional, and impermissible) of individual actions are determined by the deontic statuses of the larger sets of actions of which they are a part. And, as I show, this has a number of interesting implications both for normative theory and for our understanding of practical reasons.
Keywords obligations  reasons  rationality  options
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DOI 10.5840/jphil2013110818
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Yishai Cohen & Travis Timmerman (2016). Actualism Has Control Issues. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 10 (3):1-18.

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