Ranking judgments in arrow's setting

Synthese 173 (2):199 - 210 (2010)
Abstract
In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004). Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments proved in List and Pettit (Economics and Philosophy 18:89–110, 2002) and Arrow’s theorem (Arrow, Social choice and individual values, 1963). I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit (Synthese 140(1–2):207–235, 2004) to the conditions on the aggregation procedure.
Keywords Arrow’s theorem  Conodorcet’s paradox  Discursive dilemma  Aggregation of ranking judgments  First order logic
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-009-9568-y
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References found in this work BETA
Social Choice and Individual Values.Kenneth J. Arrow - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.
Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.

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Citations of this work BETA
Natural Deduction for Modal Logic of Judgment Aggregation.Tin Perkov - 2016 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 25 (3-4):335-354.

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