Basic reasons and first philosophy: A coherentist view of reasons

Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93 (2012)
Abstract
This paper develops and defends a coherentist account of reasons. I develop three core ideas for this defense: a distinction between basic reasons and noninferential justification, the plausibility of the neglected argument against first philosophy, and an emergent account of reasons. These three ideas form the backbone for a credible coherentist view of reasons. I work toward this account by formulating and explaining the basic reasons dilemma. This dilemma reveals a wavering attitude that coherentists have had toward basic reasons. More importantly, the basic reasons dilemma focuses our attention on the central problems that afflict coherentist views of basic beliefs. By reflecting on the basic reasons dilemma, I formulate three desiderata that any viable coherentist account of basic beliefs must satisfy. I argue that the account on offer satisfies these desiderata
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00088.x
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References found in this work BETA
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again).William G. Lycan - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):5-20.

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