Philosophical Studies 168 (2):483-489 (2014)
Chalmers (The character of consciousness, 2010) argues for an acquaintance theory of the justification of direct phenomenal beliefs. A central part of this defense is the claim that direct phenomenal beliefs are cognitively significant. I argue against this. Direct phenomenal beliefs are justified within the specious present, and yet the resources available with the present ‘now’ are so impoverished that it barely constrains the content of a direct phenomenal belief. I argue that Chalmers’s account does not have the resources for explaining how direct phenomenal beliefs support the inference from ‘this E is R’ to ‘that was R.’
|Keywords||Acquaintance Phenomenal concepts Specious present David Chalmers|
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References found in this work BETA
Introspecting Phenomenal States.Brie Gertler - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):305-28.
Citations of this work BETA
Speckled Hens and Objects of Acquaintance.Richard Fumerton - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):121–138.
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