Acta Analytica 34 (2):181-195 (2019)

Authors
Krzysztof Poslajko
Jagiellonian University
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to propose a new reading of eliminative materialism concerning propositional attitudes, along the lines of broadly understood Carnapian metametaphysics. According to the proposed reading, eliminativism should be seen as a normative metalinguistic claim that we should dispose of terms like “beliefs” and associated linguistic rules. It will be argued that such reading allows a significant philosophical problem which besets eliminativism to be solved: the problem of representation. The general idea of the problem of representation, which is taken to be one of the aspects of the celebrated “cognitive suicide” issue, is that an eliminativist has a problem with maintaining that her position represents reality. It will be argued that on the Carnapian reading an eliminativist might put forward a negative ontological claim without the need to invoke any representationalistic notions.
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-018-0369-0
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Doing Without Concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4 (11):20-40.

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