Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):743 - 747 (2009)
Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson's influential article "Knowing How" argues that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. One objection to their view is that knowledge-how is significantly different than knowledge-that because Gettier cases afflict the latter but not the former. Stanley and Williamson argue that this objection fails. Their response, however, is not adequate. Moreover, I sketch a plausible argument that knowledge-how is not susceptible to Gettier cases. This suggests a significant distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how.
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Skill in Epistemology II: Skill and Know How.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):650-660.
Knowledge‐How and Cognitive Achievement.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):181-199.
Similar books and articles
Properties and Paradox in Graham Priest's "Towards Non-Being". [REVIEW]Daniel Nolan - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):191 - 198.
Misleading Dispositions and the Value of Knowledge.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:241-258.
A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem.Stephen Hetherington - 2001 - Journal of Philosophical Research 26:307-324.
Justification Without Awareness.Ted Poston - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):570-573.
Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?Stephen R. Grimm - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):515-535.
The Significance of Fallibilism Within Gettier's Challenge: A Case Study.Stephen Hetherington - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):539-547.
Nicholas Rescher: Common-Sense: A New Look at an Old Philosophical Tradition.Ted Poston - 2007 - Faith and Philosophy 24 (3):361-363.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads102 ( #49,120 of 2,164,288 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #50,899 of 2,164,288 )
How can I increase my downloads?