Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):331-346 (2001)
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| Abstract |
del's appeal to mathematical intuition to ground our grasp of the axioms of set theory, is notorious. I extract from his writings an account of this form of intuition which distinguishes it from the metaphorical platonism of which Gödel is sometimes accused and brings out the similarities between Gödel's views and Dummett's.
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| DOI | 10.1093/philmat/9.3.331 |
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References found in this work BETA
Some Remarks on Logical Form.L. Wittgenstein - 1929 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 9 (1):162 - 171.
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Citations of this work BETA
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