Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):331-346 (2001)

Michael Potter
Cambridge University
del's appeal to mathematical intuition to ground our grasp of the axioms of set theory, is notorious. I extract from his writings an account of this form of intuition which distinguishes it from the metaphorical platonism of which Gödel is sometimes accused and brings out the similarities between Gödel's views and Dummett's.
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DOI 10.1093/philmat/9.3.331
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References found in this work BETA

Collected Works.Kurt Gödel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Language, Truth and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1948 - Philosophy 23 (85):173-176.
Some Remarks on Logical Form.L. Wittgenstein - 1929 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 9 (1):162 - 171.
Language, Truth and Logic.E. N. - 1936 - Journal of Philosophy 33 (12):328.

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Citations of this work BETA

Are There No Things That Are Scientific Theories?Steven French & Peter Vickers - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (4):771-804.
On Gödel’s “Platonism”.Pierre Cassou-Noguès - 2011 - Philosophia Scientae 15:137-172.
Fictionalism and Mathematical Objectivity.Iulian D. Toader - 2012 - In Metaphysics and Science. University of Bucharest Press. pp. 137-158.

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