Linnebo on Analyticity and Thin Existence

Philosophia Mathematica 32 (3):332–357 (2024)
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Abstract

In his groundbreaking book, Thin Objects, Linnebo (2018) argues for an account of neo-Fregean abstraction principles and thin existence that does not rely on analyticity or conceptual rules. It instead relies on a metaphysical notion he calls “sufficiency”. In this short discussion, I defend the analytic or conceptual rule account of thin existence.

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Mark Povich
University of Rochester

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References found in this work

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):153-226.
Ordinary Objects.Amie L. Thomasson (ed.) - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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