Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):712-713 (2005)

Tomasello et al. argue that the “small difference that made a big difference” in the evolution of the human mind was the disposition to share intentions. Chimpanzees are said to understand certain mental states (like intentions), but not share them. We argue that an alternative model is better supported by the data: the capacity to represent mental states (and other unobservable phenomena) is a human specialization that co-evolved with natural language.
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DOI 10.1017/s0140525x05450128
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What Chimpanzees Know About Seeing, Revisited: An Explanation of the Third Kind.Josep Call & Michael Tomasello - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press. pp. 45--64.


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