Complex Experience, Relativity and Abandoning Simultaneity

Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):231-256 (2010)
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Starting from the special theory of relativity it is argued that the structure of an experience is extended over time, making experience dynamic rather than static. The paper describes and explains what is meant by phenomenal parts and outlines opposing positions on the experience of time. Time according to he special theory of relativity is defined and the possibility of static experience shown to be implausible, leading to the conclusion that experience is dynamic. Some implications of this for the relationship of phenomenology to the physical world are considered.



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Sean Enda Power
University College, Cork

Citations of this work

The experience and perception of time.Robin Le Poidevin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances.Oliver Rashbrook - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):584-610.
Perceiving External Things and the Time‐Lag Argument.Sean Enda Power - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):94-117.

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References found in this work

The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

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