How To Avoid Mis‐Reiding Hume's Maxim Of Conceivability

Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):105-119 (2013)
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Abstract

In his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Thomas Reid offers a barrage of objections to the view, held by David Hume, that conceivability implies possibility. In this paper, I present Reid's first two objections to the ‘maxim of conceivability’ and defend Hume from them. The first objection concerns our ability to understand impossible claims, while the second concerns thoughts about impossible claims (such as, for instance, the thought that they are impossible). Reid's objections have special force against Hume because of his commitment to analyse all operations of the understanding in terms of conception. I argue that these objections fail, on the grounds that they presuppose substantive views about language which we are not warranted in attributing to Hume. Ultimately, Reid's objections help us draw out a set of intertwined issues about the language-mind relationship in Hume

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Lewis Powell
State University of New York, Buffalo

Citations of this work

Locke, Hume, and Reid on the Objects of Belief.Lewis Powell - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (1):21-38.
Hume on the Imagination.Fabian Dorsch - 2015 - Rero Doc Digital Library:1-28.
Predication and Hume's Conceivability Principle.Hsueh Qu - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (2):442-464.
Certainly useless: empiricists’ uncomfortable relationship with intuition.Lewis Powell - 2023 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (4):724-743.

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