European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):94-117 (2013)

Authors
Sean Enda Power
University of Leeds (PhD)
Abstract
We seem to directly perceive external things. But can we? According to the time‐lag argument, we cannot. What we directly perceive happens now. There is a time‐lag between our perceptions and the external things we seem to directly perceive; these external things happen in the past; thus, what we directly perceive must be something else, for example, sense‐data, and we can only at best indirectly perceive other things. This paper examines the time‐lag argument given contemporary metaphysics. I argue that this argument is not as compelling as it may initially seem. First, it denies that what we directly perceive can ever be what it seems to be; second, it conflicts with the current physical conception of time, relativity theory. This latter point leads to a more general one: the argument's force depends on a particular metaphysical conception on time, presentism, which is controversial in contemporary metaphysics of time. Given the alternative conception, eternalism, the argument is much less compelling. The overall argument of this paper, then, is that, if one wishes to hold that we directly perceive external things, we should subscribe to the latter view of time, i.e., eternalism.
Keywords naive theories of perception  time-lag  direct perception
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1111/ejop.2013.21.issue-1
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,337
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Sense and Sensibilia.J. L. AUSTIN - 1962 - Oxford University Press.
Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 1948 - London and New York: Routledge.
Seeing And Knowing.Fred I. Dretske - 1969 - Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.

View all 36 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Eternalism and Perspectival Realism About the ‘Now’.Matias Slavov - 2020 - Foundations of Physics 50 (11):1398-1410.
Naïve Realism, Seeing Stars, and Perceiving the Past.Alex Moran - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):202-232.
The Experience and Perception of Time.Robin Le Poidevin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Time-Lag Argument and Simultaneity.Zhiwei Gu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11231-11248.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Time Without Rate.Takeshi Sakon - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (3):471-496.
The Argument From Conflicting Appearances.Onkar Ghate - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Calgary (Canada)
Descartes' Proof of the External World.James D. Stuart - 1986 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 3 (1):19 - 28.
Berkeley and the Time-Gap Argument.Mykolas Drunga - 2011 - In Timo Airaksinen & Bertil Belfrage (eds.), Berkeley's Lasting Legacy: 300 Years Later. Cambridge Scholars Press.
Statues and Lumps: A Strange Coincidence?Mark Moyer - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):401-423.
Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):378-410.
Gegenwärtige existenz und ‚cross-time‘-relationen.Pedro Schmechtig - 2009 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 78 (1):131-157.
11 Anti-Individualism, Self-Knowledge, and Why Skepticism Cannot Be Cartesian.Leora Weitzman - 2010 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O.’Rourke & Harry S. Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press. pp. 263.
The Logical Status of ‘God’.Ian Walker - 1980 - Religious Studies 16 (2):217.
It’s About Time: Defusing the Ticking Bomb Argument.J. Jeremy Wisnewski - 2008 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (1):103-116.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2010-08-20

Total views
184 ( #63,787 of 2,508,046 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #169,107 of 2,508,046 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes