Authors
Steve Clarke
Charles Sturt University
Abstract
The dominant view in the cognitive science of religion (the ‘Standard Model’) is that religious belief and behaviour are not adaptive traits but rather incidental byproducts of the cognitive architecture of mind. Because evidence for the Standard Model is inconclusive, the case for it depends crucially on its alleged methodological superiority to selectionist alternatives. However, we show that the Standard Model has both methodological and evidential disadvantages when compared with selectionist alternatives. We also consider a pluralistic approach, which holds that religion or various aspects of religion originated as byproducts of evolved cognitive structures but were subsequently co-opted for adaptive purposes. We argue that when properly formulated, the pluralistic approach also has certain advantages over the Standard Model
Keywords Evolutionary Psychology   Religion
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axr035
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References found in this work BETA

Modularity in Cognition: Framing the Debate.H. Clark Barrett & Robert Kurzban - 2006 - Psychological Review 113 (3):628-647.
Exploring the Natural Foundations of Religion.Justin L. Barrett - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (1):29-34.
Perceptual Causality and Animacy.Brian J. Scholl & Patrice D. Tremoulet - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (8):299-309.

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Citations of this work BETA

Showing Our Seams: A Reply to Eric Funkhouser.Neil Levy - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (7):991-1006.
HIDD’N HADD in Intelligent Design.Andrew Ross Atkinson - 2020 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 20 (3-4):304-316.

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