Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 14 (1):141-173 (2009)

Abstract
The paper aims at giving a general exposition of John Searle’s solution of the mind-body problem – biological naturalism – and examines its fundamental theses, and some of its consequences. The exam of such theses – which delineates the characteristics of Searle's theory – shows that the theory has three main difficulties, since it   holds some assertions which at first sight seem to be incompatible
Keywords mind-body problem  redução, causação mental  mental causation.  reduction  Problema mente-corpo  Searle
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Reprint years 2010
DOI 10.5216/phi.v14i1.8795
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